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Stepparent Adoption and Involuntary
Termination of Parental Rights:




Missouri courts have repeatedly been presented with situations where the
petitioners for involuntary termination of parental rights and stepparent
adoption have actively interfered with the non-custodial parent's relationship
and visitation rights with the child, prior to bringing the action.2 By
preventing contact between the non-custodial parent and the child, the
petitioners may be able to cause a finding that the non-custodial parent has
willfully abandoned or neglected the child, thus eliminating the need for the
non-custodial parent's consent to the adoption. The courts have reached
inconsistent results in these cases, sometimes emphasizing this fact in denying
the petition, and in other cases essentially ignoring it and allowing the
adoption In In re A.L.H.,4 the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District,
affirmed the granting of an adoption despite strong evidence of such
misconduct by the petitioners.' Because the decisions in this area are in
conflict, the issue appears ripe for resolution by the Missouri Supreme Court.
This Note contends that where the custodial parent and his/her new
spouse have significantly interfered with the non-custodial parent's relationship
with the child, the equitable maxim of "unclean hands" should be invoked and
the doors of the juvenile court closed to the petitioners seeking a termination
of parental rights and stepparent adoption.6 Although adoption is a purely
statutory action, it clearly involves the custody and welfare of children, and
thus may be properly understood as inherently equitable in nature.7
Therefore, no doubt should exist as to the inherent power of the court to apply
equitable doctrines in adoption cases.'
1. 906 S.W.2d 373 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
2. See infra notes 63-96 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 63-96 and accompanying text.
4. 906 S.W.2d 373 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
5. See infra notes 12-51, 21848 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 277-306 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 155-201 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 155-201, 280-81 and accompanying text.
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Involuntary termination of parental rights/stepparent adoption can be
readily distinguished from other actions involving children, such as custody,
visitation, and child support, where application of the "unclean hands" maxim
has consistently been held inappropriate.9 Because the entire parent-child
relationship is at stake, and because improper considerations often motivate
custodial parents to bring such actions, misconduct by custodial parents should
be particularly relevant to the court's decision whether to exercise
jurisdiction." Moreover, application of the "unclean hands" doctrine to these
cases would bring consistency to this area of the law, protecting the integrity
of the courts and preventing the incongruity that custodial parents may be able
to "create" the statutory grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights
by refusing to provide court-ordered visitation."
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
A.L.H. (Daughter), the only child of the parties, was born on September
29, 1984.12 Her parents' marriage was dissolved on October 2, 1987, in St.
Louis County. 3  Under the separation agreement incorporated into the
dissolution decree, custody of Daughter was awarded to Mother, and Father
agreed to pay $60.00 per week in child support.14 The visitation schedule
gave Father temporary custody every other weekend, and for two weeks in the
summer "as long as [Father was] on vacation from his job.""
Mother remarried on May 9, 1992, and Daughter lived continuously with
Mother and Stepfather after that time.'6 On March 3, 1993, Mother and
Stepfather filed their petition for stepparent adoption of Daughter, alleging that
Father had "willfully abandoned and neglected daughter for a period of at least
six months" before the filing of the petition.' Father did not consent to the
9. See infra notes 97-134, 285-92 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 107-34, 288-92 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 131, 293-306 and accompanying text.





17. Id. The petition was filed pursuant to Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.040(5) (1994),
which provides:
The consent of the adoption of a child is not required of... [a] parent who
has for at least six months, for a child one year of age or older, or at least
sixty days, for a child under one year of age, immediately prior to the filing
of the petition for adoption, willfully abandoned the child, or, for a period
of at least six months immediately prior to the filing of the petition for
[Vol. 61
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adoption, and filed an answer denying the allegations of abandonment and
neglect."
Father had never been current in his child support payments.' Mother
testified that until April 1990 Father's payments were "very sporadic" and
seldom for the full amount.20 There was approximately one year of
"somewhat regular" payments after April 1990. During the six months
before the adoption petition was filed, he made only one $25.00 payment, in
September 1992, which was dropped off at Mother's grandparents' home.'
The next payment was not made until October 1993, approximately eight
months after the petition was filed.'
Father contended that he failed to pay because he was unable to make the
support payments and because Mother interfered with his visitation of
Daughter after December 1991.24 Father had over 100 hours of college
credit." However, his only period with a regular paycheck was between
spring 1990 and summer 1991; other than that, he testified his job situation
was "not stable," with "a lot of odd jobs."'26 He worked for a lawn
maintenance company during the summers of 1991-93, and had winter
employment with restaurants and convenience stores. Father's federal
income tax returns showed his gross income for years 1991, 1992, and 1993
to have been $1,638.00, $6,255.00, and $5,233.00, respectively.28 He had
some additional income from odd jobs and lawn maintenance which he did not
always declare on income tax, and he occasionally paid no rent in return for
services to his landlord.29
adoption, willfully, substantially and continuously neglected to provide him
with necessary care and protection.
18. A.L.H., 906 S.W.2d at 375.
19. Id. at 377.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 376.
23. Id.




28. Id. Nine hundred forty dollars of Father's income in 1992 and $3,486.00 of
his 1993 income was derived from unemployment compensation. Id. at 380 (Crahan,
J., dissenting).
29. Id at 378. The dissent noted that Father was also often unemployed during
the marriage, "although he advertised for odd jobs and attempted to start his own
business." Id. at 380 (Crahan, J., dissenting). Mother's income during the marriage
"consistently exceeded $20,000." Id. at 380 n.1 (Crahan, J., dissenting).
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The visitation issue was more contentious. Father did not see Daughter
from July 1991 until the filing of the petition in March 1993, a period of
approximately twenty months." Mother stated that Father infrequently
exercised his visitation rights between 1987 and 1989, though there was
"somewhat frequent" visitation between April and December 1990.31 The
only visit more than 1-2 days in duration was a seven-day visit around July
4, 1990, which Mother testified occurred at her request, at a time when she
was having financial problems.32 Mother testified that Father's first request
for visitation after the petition was filed occurred in October 1993.
Mother changed her residence in July 1991, and again after her
remarriage to Stepfather in May 1992. 3' The parties agreed that Father did
not know Mother's home address and phone number after the July 1991 move,
but the testimony otherwise conflicted.35 The parties disagreed whether
Mother had refused Father her home address and phone number, and whether
Mother had instructed her grandparents to deny Father this information.36
There was also disagreement as to whether Father had requested visitation
between January 1992 and March 1993.37
Father was able to contact Mother at work through a toll-free number.38
Mother testified that Father had called her there in August of 1991, but she
had been busy and asked him to call her back.39 He did not do so until
December 1991, at which time Mother denied him visitation on account of an
altercation between Father and his girlfriend which had occurred in Daughter's
presence during a June 1991 visitation.4" Mother did not discourage
Daughter from calling Stepfather "dad," and after Mother's remarriage, she
had allowed Daughter to begin using Stepfather's surname.4'
When Father made the September 1992 support payment, he included a
note stating that he was paying a lawyer to get visitation, and that he would
30. Id at 378.
31. Id. at378 n.4.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 378, 378 n.5.
35. Id. at 378.
36. Id. See also id. at 381 (Crahan, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 378-79.
38. Id. at 378. However, this line at work was not to be used for personal calls,
and there was no evidence that Father knew Mother's work address. Id. at 381
(Crahan, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 378.
40. Id. at 378, 378 n.6. See also id. at 381, 381 n.3 (Crahan, J., dissenting).
41. Id at 381 (Crahan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 61
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start sending $25.00 per week. 2 However, Father apparently had difficulty
coming up with the funds for a retainer and ultimately had to change
counsel.43 After Father had retained legal counsel to attempt to enforce his
visitation rights, he attempted to forward gifts to Daughter at Christmas and
on her birthday, through his former mother-in-law; he later learned that these
gifts had been donated to others."
The guardian ad litem concluded that Mother had failed to prove willful
neglect or abandonment by clear, cogent and convincing evidence.45
However, the Circuit Court of St. Louis County46 found that Father had
willfully abandoned and neglected Daughter for at least the six-month
statutory period, and that it was in Daughter's best interest that the adoption
be approved, thus terminating Father's parental rights.47 A divided Missouri
Court of Appeals, Eastern District,48 affirmed, holding that Mother's showing
of nonpayment of child support shifted the burden of proof on the neglect
issue to Father,49 that on these facts he had failed to establish that his
nonpayment was not willful,5" and that disposition of this issue made a
finding on the willful abandonment issue unnecessary.5
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Missouri Statutory and Case Law Background
The history and development of Missouri adoption law has been well
documented elsewhere. 2 A Missouri adoption terminates all rights and
42. Id. at 376. However, no more $25.00 payments were made. See supra notes
19-29 and accompanying text.
43. Id. at 381 (Crahan, J., dissenting).
44. Id at 380 n.2 (Crahan, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 379 (Crahan, J., dissenting).
46. Melvyn W. Wiesman, J. Id. at 373.
47. Id. at 375. The trial court found Father's testimony concening his requests
for visitation after Christmas 1991 not credible, and stated that "[a]though [father]
indicated he was not aware of the whereabouts of the minor child, [father] made no
efforts to locate the child during the period of January, 1992 to March 3, 1993." Id,
at 378, 378 n.3.
48. Reinhard, Presiding Judge, wrote the majority opinion in which Gary M.
Gaertner, J., concurred. Crahan, J., wrote in dissent. Id. at 375, 379.
49. Id. at 377.
50. Id. at 378.
51. Id, at 379.
52. See generally Hockaday v. Lynn, 98 S.W. 585, 585-89 (Mo. 1906); Rush H.
Limbaugh, The Adoption of Children in Missouri, 2 Mo. L. REv. 300 (1937); A.M.
Clark, Proposed Changes in Missouri Laws Affecting Children: Recommendations of
5
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duties between the adopted child and its natural parents, and the child is
thereafter for all purposes deemed to be the child of the adoptive parents. 3
Natural parents often remarry following divorce, and frequently the new
stepparent wants to adopt the stepchild(ren). Chapter 453 of the Revised
Statutes of Missouri governs adoptions in this circumstance as well as
others.54 The statute is to be construed "so as to promote the best interests
and welfare of the child in recognition of the entitlement of the child to a
permanent and stable home." 5 Adoption proceedings take place in the
juvenile division of the circuit court and are in the nature of a civil suit. 6
When the other natural parent is still living, he/she must ordinarily
consent to the adoption." However, since 1917, Missouri law has provided
that if the parental rights of the other parent have been terminated, such
consent is not necessary.58  The most common statutory grounds for
the Children's Code Commission-Adoption of Children, 12 Mo. L. REV. 310 (1947);
Harold S. Cook & Fred A. Eppenberger, The New Adoption Act, 4 J. Mo. B. 228
(1948); Harold S. Cook, Adoption Revisited, 27 Mo. L. REV. 391 (1962).
For a broad overview of the history of adoption, see John Francis Brosnan, The
Law ofAdoption, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 332, 332-40 (1922); Leo Albert Huard, The Law
of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743 (1956); Stephen B. Presser,
The Historical Background of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443
(1972); Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child
Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 1038 (1979).
See also Robert S. Gardner, Comment, Equitable Adoption in Missouri, 20 Mo.
L. REV. 199 (1955); Donald J. Stohr, Comment, Comments on the Missouri Laws of
Adoption in Light ofBedinger v. Graybill's Executor and Trustee, 4 ST. LouIs U. L.J.
477 (1957); John M. Speca, Some Custody Problems Under Missouri's Adoption Law,
32 UMKC L. REV. 314 (1964).
53. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.090 (1994); Application of Graham, 199 S.W.2d 68,
72-73 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946); Limbaugh, supra note 52, at 300; 1 MissouRI FAMILY
LAW §§ 4.18-4.21 (Mo. Bar 4th ed. 1988, 1995).
54. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 453.010-453.030, 453.090.1 (1994); 1 MIsSOuRJ FAMILY
LAW, supra note 53, § 4.8.
55. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.005 (1994).
56. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.010.1 (1994); Limbaugh, supra note 52, at 304 (citing
In re McFarland, 12 S.W.2d 523 (Mo. Ct. App. 1928)).
57. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.030.3 (1994).
58. 1917 Mo. Laws 193; Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 1096-97 (1919). The statute has
been amended several times and is found in its present form at Mo. REV. STAT.
§§ 453.030-453.040 (1994).
A great deal of literature exists on this topic. See, e.g., Maryann Zavez,
Rethinking Vermont's Termination of Parental Rights Laws: Guidelines for a
Comprehensive Termination of Parental Rights Statute, 19 VT. L. REV. 49 (1994);
Stephen W. Hayes & Michael J. Morse, Adoption and Termination Proceedings in
Wisconsin: Straining the Wisdom of Solomon, 66 MARQ. L. REv. 439 (1983); Deborah
1000 [Vol. 61
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involuntary termination of parental rights are findings of willful abandonment
or willful, substantial, and continuous neglect of the child for at least six
months immediately prior to filing the adoption petition. 9 As A.L.H.
illustrates, actions for involuntary termination of parental rights and for
stepparent adoption are often brought in the same petition.60
Missouri courts have consistently held that in cases involving involuntary
termination of parental rights, the adoption statutes are to be strictly construed
in favor of the rights of the natural parents. Parental rights will be
Bell, Termination of Parental Rights: Recent Judicial and Legislative Trends, 30
EMORY L.J. 1065 (1981); James Boskey & John W. McCue, Alternative Standards for
Termination of Parental Rights, 9 SETON HALL L. REv. 1 (1978); W. David Kiser,
Note, Termination of Parental Rights-Suggested Reforms and Responses, 16 J. FAM.
L. 239 (1977-78); Margarete L. Eggington & Richard E. Hibbs, Comment,
Termination of Parental Rights in Adoption Cases: Focusing on the Child, 14 J. FAM.
L. 547 (1975-76); Paul Larsen, Trends and Developments in Oregon Family Law:
Parental Rights and Child Welfare, 43 OR. L. REv. 193, 193-199, 207-10 (1964);
Helen Simpson, The Unfit Parent: Conditions Under Which A Child May Be Adopted
Without the Consent of His Parent, 39 U. DET. L.J. 347 (1962); Note,
Adoption-Effect of Abandonment on Necessity of Natural Parent's Consent-Welfare
of Child, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 788 (1947); Almond G. Shepard, Adoption Without
Consent of Natural Parents, 17 CASE & COM. 391 (1911).
59. Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.040(5) (1994). The required statutory period of
abandonment or neglect is only sixty days if the child is under one year of age. Id.
See also 1 MissouRi FAMILY LAW, supra note 53, § 4.48.
Similar grounds for termination of parental rights in a proceeding brought by the
juvenile officer are set forth at Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.447 (1994). See generally Mo.
REv. STAT. §§ 211.442-211.487 (1994); Shawn R. McCarver, Termination of Parental
Rights in Missouri, 45 J. Mo. B. 475 (1989); 43 C.J.S. Infants §§ 39-40 (1978 &
Supp. 1995).
60. Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.444.1 (1994).
61. See, e.g., Application of Graham, 199 S.W.2d 68, 73, 75 (Mo. Ct. App.
1946); In re Adoption of J-, 396 S.W.2d 257, 261 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); In re
Adoption of Rule, 435 S.W.2d 35,40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968); In re E.C.N., 517 S.W.2d
709, 712 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) ("It is of course true that the statute is to be liberally
construed with a view to promoting the best interests of the child, but such liberal
construction is obviously not to be extended to the question of when the natural parents
may be divested of their rights to the end that all legal relationship between them and
their child shall cease and determine."); In re Adoption of R.A.B., 562 S.W.2d 356,
360 (Mo. 1978) (en banc); In re T.C.M., 651 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983);
In re Adoption of W.B.L., 681 S.W.2d 452, 455 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); In re A.R.M.,
750 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (en banc); In re A.L.H., 906 S.W.2d 373, 375
(Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
1001
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terminated only where the petitioners prove one of the statutory grounds of
abandonment or neglect by "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence."62
The general fact pattern of A.L.H., in which the custodial parent and
his/her new spouse have materially interfered with noncustodial parent's
relationship with the child prior to filing the adoption petition, has been a
recurrent one in Missouri cases. In most instances the courts have considered
it a material factor in denying the adoption; however, there are also cases
where, as in A.L.H., the adoption was granted despite evidence of such
conduct.
In In re Adoption of Rule,63 the Missouri Court of Appeals, Kansas City
District,' reversed the granting of a petition for adoption of a twelve-year-
old boy where the father had discontinued making child support payments
after the mother and her new husband refused him visitation.65  Though
criticizing the father for withholding support payments, the court found no
evidence that the child's best interests would be served by terminating his
father's rights." The court observed that while the stepfather might naturally
prefer no further contact with the child's natural father, he had assumed that
obligation upon marrying the mother.67
The Missouri Court of Appeals, St. Louis District, in In re E.C.N.,68
refused to find willful abandonment within the meaning of the statute where
the non-custodial mother had tried to maintain contact with her children
through a variety of creative efforts, almost all of which were frustrated by the
custodial father.69 The court noted that the children were not infants, and
that while adoption would change a legal relationship for them, it could not
"erase memory and feeling."7 The court noted the permanent consequences
of termination of parental rights, and then reprimanded the father in stern
language:
62. In re Adoption of W.B.L., 681 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (citing
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 749 n.3 (1982)); In re T.C.M., 651 S.W.2d 525,
530-31, 531 nn.7-8 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
63. 435 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968).
64. Until 1978, the Eastern, Western, and Southern districts of the Missouri Court
of Appeals were referred to as the St. Louis District, the Kansas City District, and the
Springfield District, respectively. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 477.050-477.070 (1969);
1978 Mo. Laws 865-66; Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 477.040-477.070 (1994).
65. Rule, 435 S.W.2d at 37-42.
66. Id. at 40-41.
67. Id. at 41.
68. 517 S.W.2d 709 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
69. Id. at 712-16.
70. Id. at 716.
1002 [Vol. 61
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How often have trial courts admonished divorcing parents to refrain from
visiting their differences upon the children of the broken home? From this
record we deem such admonition richly deserves reiteration to these
divorced parents. The out-of-custody mother is entitled to assurance that
her letters, presents, and reasonable attempts to communicate with her
children will reach the children uncensored, sans bitter or disparaging
comments of the father or others at the home.7
The Missouri Supreme Court used similar language in In re Adoption of
R.A.B.,72 where the father had become delinquent in child support payments,
and was on poor terms with the mother's new husband.73 Instead of seeking
to enforce the child support obligation through appropriate legal methods, the
mother and stepfather denied the natural father visitation, and then petitioned
for adoption.74 The court refused to find willful neglect, and noted that the
non-custodial father "is entitled to assurances that his letters, presents, and
reasonable attempts to communicate with and visit with his children will be
honored without disparagement by the mother or her new husband."75
Adoption petitions were also denied by the Missouri Court of Appeals,
Southern District, in In re Adoption of S.E.F.,76 a case very similar to A.L.H.,
and by the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, in Deardorff v.
Bohannon.77 In both cases the courts found interference by the custodial
parent with the non-custodial parent's visitation rights,78 and determined that
willful neglect had not been established on the facts.79
However, several Missouri decisions have granted stepparent adoption
petitions despite the custodial parent's interference with the relationship
between the non-custodial parent and the child. The Missouri Supreme Court
approved the grant of such a petition, involving a ten-year-old child, in In re
Adoption of W.B.L.80 Writing in dissent, Judge Blackmar observed that, but
for the father's interference with visitation, the statutory period of
71. Id.
72. 562 S.W.2d 356 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
73. Id. at 357-61.
74. Id. at 360-61.
75. Id. at 361.
76. 634 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
77. 761 S.W.2d 651 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
78. S.E.F., 634 S.W.2d at 266-67; Deardorff, 761 S.W.2d at 654-55.
79. S.E.F., 634 S.W.2d at 266; Deardorf, 761 S.W.2d at 654-55. See also In re
Adoption of J.M.K., 363 S.W.2d 67, 70-75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962) (refusing to find
grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights and adoption where petitioners,
friends of the natural mother who had agreed to care for the child when the mother fell
on hard times, interfered with the relationship between the mother and the child).
80. 681 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. 1984) (en bane).
1003
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abandonment would have been interrupted."' He criticized the decision as
inconsistent with the principle that "adoption statutes are to be construed
strictly in favor of the natural parents."82 Judge Blackmar argued that
The trial judge well might believe that it would be better for the child if the
natural mother were completely eliminated from his life and thought. But
this is not enough. This is not a custody case. The mother who bore the
child has rights, carefully delineated by law. The principal opinion ignores
these rights and gives trial judges powers not intended.83
Judge Rendlen, dissenting in an earlier appeal of the same case, expressed
identical concerns.84
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, also refused to find
interference with contact a sufficient ground to deny adoption in two recent
cases prior to A.L.H.. In the unusual case of In re A.R.M,8 s the natural
father had murdered the mother and was in prison. Custody of the child was
given to the maternal grandmother, who interfered substantially with the
father's efforts to maintain contact and who later petitioned for adoption.86
Conceding that the petitioner (grandmother) was not entitled to "create the
grounds for a nonconsensual adoption," the court maintained that the facts did
not support the conclusion that this had occurred. The court further held that
the issue was irrelevant, since the father had abandoned the child as a matter
of law by murdering the mother.8
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Karohl argued that "petitioner [had] willfully
and intentionally prevented any contact between the natural father and his
family with the child.... .88 He concluded
By her actions petitioner is not qualified to invoke the jurisdiction of the
adoption court on the claim of abandonment and that issue is determinative
that the trial court erred as a matter of law in permitting the petitioner to
adopt A.R.M.89
81. Id. at 456 (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
82. Id.
83. Id at 457 (Blackmar, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
84. In re Adoption of W.B.L., 647 S.W.2d 531, 534-35 (Mo. 1983) (en banc)
(Rendlen, J., dissenting), appeal after remand, 681 S.W.2d 452 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
85. 750 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (en bane).
86. Id at 87-90.
87. Id. at 90.
88. Id. at 91 (Karohl, J., dissenting).
89. Id (emphasis added).
1004 [Vol. 61
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Judge Karohl predicted that the decision would "imperil the rights of
noncustodial parents following dissolution proceedings" by encouraging
custodial parents to interfere with the relationship between the non-custodial
parent and the child.9" He observed that this situation was not uncommon
and that the court's holding diminished the pleading and proof required for
finding willful abandonment.9' He argued that the decision conflicted with
In re Adoption of Rule, supra, and that the Missouri Supreme Court should
address the issue of the petitioner's disqualification.92
In the subsequent case of G.S.M v. T.H.B.,9 the Missouri Court of
Appeals, Eastern District, noted petitioners' interference with visitation but
gave little attention to the issue, where the non-custodial father was delinquent
in child support payments.94 Concluding that the child's right to support
does not depend on the mother's noninterference with visitation, the court held
that a finding of willful neglect was not precluded, and reversed the trial
court's denial of the adoption petition.9"
Cases presenting this basic fact situation have thus been fairly common
in Missouri, and similar cases have been noted in other jurisdictions.96
Although courts have often refused to grant the adoption petition where the
custodial parent and subsequent spouse actively interfered with the non-
custodial parent-child relationship, W.B.L., A.R.M, G.S.M, and the principal
case illustrate that this pattern is not uniform. Before considering the
applicability of the unclean hands doctrine in such situations, it will be helpful
to place the issue in context by briefly examining the individual interests at
stake in the proceeding for involuntary termination of parental rights and
stepparent adoption.
90. Id. at 94.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 94-95.
93. 786 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
94. Id. at 903-04.
95. Id
96. See S.M.K. v. R.G.G., 702 P.2d 620 (Alaska 1985); In re Cedo Pavolovic,
508 N.Y.S.2d 234 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); In re Adoption of Holcomb, 481 N.E.2d
613, 619-21 (Ohio 1985) (all cited at In re A.R.M., 750 S.W.2d 86, 92 (Mo. Ct. App.
1988) (en banc) (Karohl, J., dissenting)); Charles R. Pinzone, Jr., Note, Ohio's
Exception to Consent in Adoption Proceedings: A Need for Legislative Action, 36
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 348, 363-66 (1985) (discussing In re Adoption of Hupp, 458
N.E.2d 878 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982)); Simpson, supra note 58, at 377, 377 n.203 (1962)
(citing cases); Suzanne Miller, Comment, Protecting Parents and Children Through
Adoption Proceedings, 7 J. Juv. L. 212, 214-15, 215 n.21 (1983) (citing Chrisos v.
Egleston, 644 S.W.2d 326 (Ark. Ct. App. 1983) ("But, where the mother actively
frustrated a father's efforts, parental rights were preserved."); Hinkle v. Lindsey, 424
So. 2d 983 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
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B. Understanding The Individual
Interests at Stake
Eighty years ago, Dean Roscoe Pound identified the various individual
interests involved in family law cases, separate from the "social interest in the
family and marriage as social institutions."97 Domestic relations law seeks
to maintain and preserve the integrity of these interests, and to secure them as
against the world and as between the parties.98 He identified the individual
interests of parents, children, husbands, and wives, each of which involves
claims "against the world at large and also against the other party to the
relation." '99 Pound observed that while children's interests received little
protection at common law, the modem trend is to give greater weight to the
interests of the child over the parents' claim to custody and control.'
Consistent with this trend, the Missouri legislature has mandated that the
adoption statutes "shall be construed so as to promote the best interests and
welfare of the child . . . ."0' However, this directive, while investing trial
courts with broad discretion, is vague at best, and supplies little content as to
what the child's best interests actually are in the stepparent adoption
context.
0 2
When the petition concerns custody,0 3 visitation,'04 or child
support, 5 substantial interests of the child are readily apparent. A change
of custody may protect the child from actual harm, or may place the child in
a more stable environment. Visitation rights are ordinarily provided so the
child will have the opportunity of continuing contact with both natural
97. Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L.
REV. 177, 177 (1916).
98. Id
99. Id. at 181.
100. Id. at 181-87.
101. Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.005 (1994).
102. See generally Carl E. Schneider, The Tension Between Rules and Discretion
in Family Law: A Report and Reflection, 27 FAM. L.Q. 229 (1993).
103. See generally Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 452.375-452.395, 452.405-452.411,
452.440-452.550, 512.025 (1994).
104. See generally Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 452.400-452.403 (1994).
105. See generally Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 452.340-452.350, 452.370, 452.416,
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parents."° The need for enforcement of the non-custodial parent's child
support obligations to protect the child's economic interests is also obvious.
Though stepparent adoption can be a valuable procedure in many
circumstances, the child ordinarily has less to gain, and more to lose. When
a custodial parent and his/her new spouse petition for a stepparent adoption,
the child is ordinarily already in their custody, receiving proper and adequate
care. 7 It has thus been argued that stepparent adoption accomplishes little
in the way of protecting the child from harm. 8 Moreover, the stepparent
adoption involves great costs to the child. Because the adoption permanently
severs all rights of the natural parent, including the right to visitation, the
child loses the opportunity for any continued relationship with the natural
parent."°  Numerous legal writers have collected the psychological and
social science literature documenting the substantial harm often caused to
children by the loss of all ties with their natural parents."' This
phenomenon has led several authors to call for an "intermediate" sort of
remedy (e.g., "permanent custody," "weak adoption," or "open adoption")
providing for a sort of adoption with preservation of some natural parent
visitation rights."'
106. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.375.3 (1994) ("[I]t is the public policy of this
state to assure children frequent and meaningful contact with both parents after the
parents have separated or dissolved their marriage ... ").
107. D. Marianne Brower Blair, Parent-Initiated Termination of Parental Rights:
The Ultimate Weapon in Matrimonial Warfare, 24 TULSA L.J. 299, 335-37 (1989).
108. Id; Douglas E. Cressler, Requiring Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt in
Parental Rights Termination Cases, 32 J. FAM. L. 785, 795 (1993-94).
109. See supra note 53.
110. See Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV.
423,461-72 (1983); Blair, supra note 107, at 345-50; Miller, supra note 96, at 215-16;
Cressler, supra note 108, at 796-99; Naomi Michaels, The Dangers of a Change of
Parentage in Custody andAdoption Cases, 83 L.Q. REV. 547,547-68 (1967); Candace
M. Zierdt, Make New Parents But Keep the Old, 69 N.D. L. REV. 497, 505-11 (1993).
See also Martin Guggenheim, The Effects of Recent Trends to Accelerate the
Termination of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care-An Empirical Analysis in
Two States, 29 FAM. L.Q. 121 (1995).
111. See, e.g., Simpson, supra note 58, at 391-92; Zierdt, supra note 110; James
B. Boskey, The Ties That Bind-Untangling the Rights of Natural Families in
Adoption, 12 FAM. ADVOC., Fall 1989, at 16, 17-18; Judy E. Nathan, Note, Visitation
After Adoption: In the Best Interests of the Child, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 633 (1984);
Elizabeth J. Aulik, Comment, Stepparent Custody: An Alternative to Stepparent
Adoption, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 604 (1979); Bea Witzleben, Note, Visitation Rights
for Natural Parents After StepparentAdoption, 1 ALASKA L. REV. 319 (1984); Cynthia
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Termination of parental rights also terminates the natural parent's
obligation to pay child support, so the child and custodial family may bear
economic costs as well." 2 The child also is likely to lose relationships with
other relatives of the terminated parent (e.g., grandparents, uncles, aunts,
cousins)."' Statutory rights of inheritance from and through the terminated
parent are also eliminated." 4
The interests of parents at stake in the action for involuntary termination
of parental rights are substantial. The noncustodial parent stands to lose all
future rights to a relationship with the child."' Recognizing the importance
of this interest, the United States Supreme Court concluded that
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and
management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not
been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the
State. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital
interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life." 6
As a consequence, the Court declared the "clear and convincing evidence"
standard to be a due process requirement in involuntary termination cases." 7
112. Blair, supra note 107, at 337-40. An argument has been made that in many
circumstances, fathers should not be permitted to voluntarily terminate their parental
rights in order to avoid paying a child support obligation. Khristine Ann Heisinger,
Note, Child Support Properly a Factor in Determining Best Interests of Child in
Voluntary Termination of Parental Rights, 58 Mo. L. REV. 969, 987-88 (1993).
113. Cressler, supra note 108, at 799. In Missouri, trial courts appear to have
discretion to preserve the visitation rights of grandparents following a stepparent
adoption. Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.402.6 (1994).
114. Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.090 (1994).
115. A broad range of rights and duties are encompassed under the umbrella of
"parental rights." For an excellent discussion of the subject, see J.M. Eekelaar, What
Are Parental Rights?, 89 L.Q. REV. 210 (1973).
116. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
117. Id. at 768-70.
An examination of the federal constitutional issues raised by involuntary
termination of parental rights is beyond the scope of this Note. Substantial literature
exists on this topic. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 107, at 319-27; Cressler, supra note
108, at 789-93; Raymond C. O'Brien, An Analysis of Realistic Due Process Rights of
Children Versus Parents, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1209 (1994); Francis Barry McCarthy,
The Confused Constitutional Status and Meaning of Parental Rights, 22 GA. L. REV.
975 (1988); Jacqueline Y. Parker, Dissolving Family Relations: Termination of
Parent-ChildRelations-An Overview, 11 U. DAYTON L. REv. 555, 563-585 (1986);
Timothy J. Cassidy, Comment, Termination of Parental Rights: The Substantive Due
Process Issue, 26 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 915 (1982).
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The interests of parents are complicated by the pain, bitterness, and anger
that often follow divorce," 8 leading Professor Blair to characterize parent-
initiated termination of parental rights as "the ultimate weapon in the arsenal
of matrimonial warfare." 9  Unlike a modifiable decree of custody, an
adoption decree is permanent. Termination of the ex-spouse's parental rights
may thus naturally be attractive to a custodial parent who has remarried. If
successful, it is likely to permanently remove the non-custodial parent from
the lives of the custodial parent, the new spouse, and the child.20
Evidence that personal motivations have prompted the filing of parent-
initiated termination proceedings is found in the fact that some initiating
parents have actively discouraged payment of [child] support or even
refused a tender of back due support so as not to prejudice their chances of
obtaining termination of the other parent's rights.'
Blair concludes that such proceedings are likely to serve the interests of
the parents, but not of the child.'
There is thus great potential (and temptation) for misuse of the
involuntary termination proceeding."z' Blair and others have noted that
custodial parents often inappropriately seek termination of parental
rights/stepparent adoption as a "super-custody" proceeding:
Parent-initiated proceedings to terminate another parent's parental rights are
clearly a type of custody proceeding, since the effect of termination is to
deprive one parent of all future right to custody or visitation with the child
.... Termination of parental rights in parent-initiated proceedings under
circumstances where termination fails to serve the child's best interests
would thus contravene a fundamental principle of family law ... and
frustrate the underlying rationale for the state's assertion of authority. 4
118. Blair, supra note 107, at 300.
119. Id. at 301. Professor Blair limits her discussion to parent-initiated
termination of parental rights proceedings outside the context of stepparent adoption,
id. at 317-18, but many of her observations have relevance here as well. See also
Cressler, supra note 108, at 794 ("Termination is, quite literally, the family law
equivalent of the death penalty.").
120. Blair, supra note 107, at 301-02, 352-54.
121. Id. at 353.
122. Id at 354.
123. Id. at 301-02, 352-54. Cf Shepard, supra note 58, at 395-96.
124. Blair, supra note 107, at 332-33.
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Missouri courts have at times recognized this inherent danger, and have stated
forcefully that the adoption proceeding is not to be used to resolve custody
issues. 2 '
Given the interests involved, commentators have observed that a custody-
type comparison of the two homes involved is inappropriate in the termination
of parental rights proceeding, since custody is not at issue. 2 6 The danger
that the poor, the uneducated, and members of minority groups may be
particularly at risk in termination proceedings has been recognized.' It has
been suggested that grounds sufficient for a change of custody should not be
sufficient to cause termination of parental rights, and that state legislatures
should give more content to the "best interests of the child" standard in the
termination of parental rights context by making the requirements more
demanding.' Elevated burdens of proof have been recommended. 9
Persuasive arguments have been advanced that termination of parental rights
should not be used as a "sanction" for simple non-payment of child support,
given the variety of other means available to enforce the support
obligation. 30 One writer has noted a fundamental inconsistency in the
standards applied: nonpayment of child support cannot be adequate grounds
for termination of visitation rights, but can be used to justify the termination
of all parental rights.'
125. In re Adoption of J-, 396 S.W.2d 257, 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); In re
Perkins, 117 S.W.2d 686, 691, 693 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938). The adoption/custody
distinction is also made in Richard A. Edwards, Note, Adoption-The Welfare and Best
Interests of the Child, 5 WILLAmETrE L.J. 93, 96-97 (1968).
126. Simpson, supra note 58, at 359; Cressler, supra note 108, at 799.
127. Id. at 802-04; Garrison, supra note 110, at 432-37; Lucy Cooper & Patricia
Nelson, Adoption and Termination Proceedings in Wisconsin: A Reply Proposing
Limiting Judicial Discretion, 66 MARQ. L. REv. 641, 645-47 (1983).
128. See Cooper & Nelson, supra note 127, at 648-61, 671-72 (1983); Larsen,
supra note 58, at 196-97 (citing Read v. Read, 336 P.2d 164 (Or. 1961)); James M.
Whittier, Note, Infants-Termination of Parental Rights, 14 U. KAN. L. REv. 117
(1965).
129. Blair, supra note 107, at 363-65; Cressler, supra note 108, at 805-15
(arguing for "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard); Helen Sigmond, Comment,
Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights: The Need for Clear and Convincing
Evidence, 29 AM. U. L. RaV. 771 (1980).
130. See Thomas R. Zinkula, Comment, Termination of Parental Rights: Should
Nonpayment of Child Support Be Enough?, 67 IowA L. REv. 827, 831-42 (1982);
Blair, supra note 107, at 350-52.
131. Zinkula, supra note 130, at 834-35 (discussing Iowa law). Courts in some
jurisdictions have been willing to condition visitation rights on payment of child
support, and vice versa. See generally Carolyn Eaton Taylor, Note, Making Parents
Behave: The Conditioning of Child Support and Visitation Rights, 84 CoLUM. L. REV.
[Vol. 611010
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Thus, although termination of parental rights and stepparent adoption are
in many cases beneficial to the child, this is not always the case.'32
Simpson has argued that although courts often view "parental rights" and "the
best interests of the child" as being in conflict, they are not necessarily
inconsistent.'33 She contends that although the "best interests" standard
applies in both types of cases, it should apply differently. In custody cases,
the child's rights should have clear priority; in adoption cases, the rights of the
parents should govern, "unless overcome by showing unfitness."'34
C. Potential Applicability of the Doctrine of Unclean Hands
"He who comes into Equity must come with clean hands."'35 Calling
this maxim "one of the elementary and fundamental conceptions of equity
jurisprudence,"' 36 Pomeroy explained its operation as follows:
[The maxim] says that whenever a party, who, as actor, seeks to set the
judicial machinery in motion and obtain some remedy, has violated
conscience, or good faith, or other equitable principle, in his prior conduct,
then the doors of the court will be shut against him in limine; the court will
refuse to interfere on his behalf, to acknowledge his right, or to award him
any remedy. 3 '
1059 (1984).
Cf Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.375.2(8) (1994) (which parent more likely to allow
the child "frequent and meaningful contact" with the other parent a factor in custody
determinations); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.340.6 (1994) (court may abate future support
obligation or transfer custody if it finds custodial parent has failed to provide visitation
or temporary custody, and noncustodial parent is current in payment of all support
obligations).
132. Blair, supra note 107, at 301-05; Zinkula, supra note 130, at 837; Miller,
supra note 96, at 215-16; Larsen, supra note 58, at 198 ("ordinarily no vital interest
of the child.., requires the termination of his parents' rights" (quoting Simons v.
Smith, 366 P.2d 875, 877 (Or. 1961))).
133. Simpson, supra note 58, at 354-55.
134. Id. at 354-60, 380-81.
135. 2 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 397
(Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941).
136. Id. § 398.
137. Id. § 397. For background on the unclean hands maxim, see generally id.
§§ 397-404; Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Coming Into Equity With Clean Hands, 47 MICH.
L. REv. 877 and 47 MICH. L. REV. 1065 (1949); DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES
§§ 2.4(1), (2), (5), (7) (2d ed. 1993); Rosalind Poll, Note, "He Who ComesInto Equity
Must Come With Clean Hands", 32 B.U. L. REV. 66 (1952); Edward N. Fadeley, The
Clean-Hands Doctrine in Oregon, 37 OR. L. REv. 160 (1958); Note, Application of
the "Clean Hands" Doctrine, 9 TEMP. L.Q. 220 (1935); Gerald F. Wigle, Note,
1011
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The maxim is not the "foundation and source of any equitable estate or
interest,""' but is rather a "universal rule" guiding equity courts.'39
Although not truly a matter of defense, 40 more recent texts group the
maxim among the "equitable defenses" due to its practical effect of barring the
plaintiffs cause of action. 4'
The maxim, based on "conscience and good faith,"'42 exists to protect
the integrity of the court;'43 "equity will not open its doors to enable the
perpetration of wrongful conduct."'" As a result, the court may invoke the
maxim sua sponte, even on appeal, regardless of whether it was pleaded as a
defense.' 45 Although the maxim is considered "equitable," at times it has
Equity-Clean Hands-Relationship Between Plaintiffs Prior Wrongful Act and
Present Litigation, 5 WAYNE L. REv. 263 (1959); Howard L. Oleck, Maxims of Equity
Reappraised, 6 RUTGERS L. REV. 528, 538-40 (1952).
For additional history and background on maxims and their application, see, e.g.,
HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS (6th American ed. 1868); Roscoe
Pound, The Maxims of Equity-I, 34 HARV. L. REv. 809 (1921); Ward E. Lattin, Legal
Maxims, and Their Use in Statutory Interpretations, 26 GEO. L.J. 1 (1937); Stanley
McQuade, Ancient Legal Maxims and Modern Human Rights, 38 N. IRELAND L.Q. 299
(1987).
Because application of "unclean hands" involves a choice not to exercise
jurisdiction, "unclean hands" often appears together with the closely related maxim that
"where the fault is mutual, the law will leave the case as it finds it." See Avery v.
Central Bank of Kansas City, 119 S.W. 1106, 1110 (Mo. 1909); Leeper v. Kurth, 163
S.W.2d 1031, 1033 (Mo. 1942); Rose v. Houser, 206 S.W.2d 571, 576-77 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1947).
138. 2 POMEROY, supra note 135, § 397.
139. 2 POMEROY, supra note 135, § 398.
140. Fadeley, supra note 137, at 167 (citing Taylor v. Grant, 279 P.2d 479, 485
(Or. 1955)).
141. DOBBS, supra note 137, § 2.4(1); Fadeley, supra note 137, at 165.
142. 2 POMEROY, supra note 135, § 398.
143. Poll, supra note 137, at 81; Fadeley, supra note 137, at 167 (quoting Taylor
v. Grant, 279 P.2d 479, 485 (Or. 1955)).
144. Poll, supra note 137, at 79.
145. DOBBS, supra note 137, § 2.4(2); Poll, supra note 137, at 67; Fadeley, supra
note 137, at 165, 165 nn.61-62 (citing McElwee v. McElwee, 138 P.2d 208, 209 (Or.
1943) (divorce action)); W.A. Purrington, Of MatrimonialActions as Equity Suits and
of the Pleadings Therein, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 321, 336-37 (1909). Accord Creamer v.
Bivert, 113 S.W. 1118, 1122 (Mo. 1908) (citing several earlier Missouri cases); Houtz
v. Hellman, 128 S.W. 1001, 1006 (Mo. 1910); Leeper v. Kurth, 163 S.W. 2d 1031,
1033 (Mo. 1942); Cox v. Bryant, 347 S.W.2d 861, 863-64 (Mo. 1961).
[Vol. 611012
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been applied to purely legal actions,' 46 and the scope of situations where it
is used is "constantly expanding and growing."'147
The "unclean hands" doctrine is closely related to public policy concerns;
whether courts choose to apply the maxim often depends heavily upon the
factual considerations and public policies of the case.148 Because the maxim
can have the severe effect of keeping the plaintiff from any relief on an
otherwise valid cause of action, courts have established certain limitations on
the doctrine. Courts often refuse to apply the doctrine where there is no
connection between the plaintiff s actions and the defendant's conduct which
gave rise to the case, where no actual harm was caused by the plaintiffs
conduct, or where the wrong complained of has been righted. 49
Professors Dobbs and Chafee have criticized "unclean hands" in many of
its applications. Chafee observes the maxim's potential to do "considerable
harm," and reports numerous cases where it appears to have done so. 50
Dobbs urges limiting the application of the maxim,' and suggests that there
is no room for equitable discretion to deny relief on a statutory right, unless
the statute provides otherwise. 5 2  When properly applied, however, the
maxim has been lauded as "instrumental in the preservation of justice and the
integrity of the courts."'5 There is little question that the maxim has taken
deep root in Missouri equity jurisprudence.'54
146. Poll, supra note 137, at 74. In Missouri, the maxim has been held
unavailable to bar an action for damages at law. Marvin E. Nieberg Real Estate Co.
v. Taylor-Morley-Simon, Inc., 867 S.W.2d 618, 626 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). See infra
notes 172-84 and accompanying text.
147. Oleck, supra note 137, at 540.
148. Poll, supra note 137, at 66; Chafee, supra note 137, at 1092; Note,
Application of The "Clean Hands" Doctrine, 9 TEMP. L.Q. 220, 226 (1935); Baue v.
Embalmers Federal Labor Union No. 21301 AFL-CIO, 376 S.W.2d 230, 236 (Mo.
1964) (en banc); Smith v. Holdoway Constr. Co., 129 S.W.2d 894, 902 (Mo. 1939).
149. 2 POMEROY, supra note 135, § 399; Poll, supra note 137, at 71-75; Wigle,
supra note 137. See, e.g., Clark v. Brown, 814 S.W.2d 634, 641 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991);
Osterberger v. Hites Constr. Co., 599 S.W.2d 221, 229 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); River
Corp. v. Redpath, 466 S.W.2d 140, 145 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); Price v. Ridler, 373
S.W.2d 59, 62 (Mo. 1963).
150. Chafee, supra note 137, at 878, 885-906, 1065-1091.
151. DOBBS, supra note 137, § 2.4(2).
152. Id § 2.4(7).
153. Poll, supra note 137, at 81. See also 2 POMEROY, supra note 135, § 404.
154. See, e.g., Avery v. Central Bank of Kansas City, 119 S.W. 1106, 1110-11
(Mo. 1909); Greene v. Spitzer, 123 S.W.2d 57, 62 (Mo. 1938) ("This rule is so well
known that no citation of authority is needed to sustain the maxim."); Leeper v. Kurth,
163 S.W.2d 1031, 1033 (Mo. 1942) (calling maxim a "cardinal one" which "touches
to the quick the dignity of a court of conscience itself'); Moore v. Carter, 201 S.W.2d
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Virtually nothing has been written on the applicability of the "unclean
hands" maxim to an action for involuntary termination of parental rights and
stepparent adoption, and few if any courts have explicitly considered the issue.
However, it would appear that several threshold questions must be considered:
whether stepparent adoption is equitable in nature, and hence subject to the
maxim; if not, whether as a statutory action it is subject to the maxim; and
whether application of the maxim is appropriate or helpful as a policy matter
in the family law setting.
Because "unclean hands" is an equitable doctrine, it is undoubtedly
available if stepparent adoption/termination of parental rights is equitable in
nature. It is firmly established that the jurisdiction over the custody of minors
is of an equitable nature.' The power is often claimed to be based in the
power of the Crown as parens patriae.'6 Although the origins of this
equitable jurisdiction are uncertain, it is clear that Chancery exercised
jurisdiction over the custody of minors, including the removal of minors from
the custody of their parents, by the eighteenth century. 7 Justice Story
wrote that "[t]he jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery extends to the care of
the person of the infant, so far as necessary for his protection and
education."'
923, 929 (Mo. 1947); State ex rel. General Dynamics Corp. v. Luten, 566 S.W.2d 452,
460 (Mo. 1978) (en banc); Best v. Culhane, 677 S.W.2d 390, 394-95 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984); Hardesty v. Mr. Cribbins's Old House, Inc., 679 S.W.2d 343, 348 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984).
155. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 1328-41
(F.V. Balch ed., 1lth ed. 1873) (exploring the origins of the jurisdiction in great
detail); 3 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 1303-
08 (1886); 2 POMEROY, supra note 135, §§ 1303-08 (citing additional cases); JOHN
ADAMS, THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITY 594-614 (Henry Wharton ed., 4th American ed.
1859); JOHN WILLARD, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 617-30 (1863); James
Ram, Observations upon the Power Exercised by the Court of Chancery of depriving
a Father of the Custody of his Children, 39 Q. REv. 183, 183-97 (1829) (discussing
in detail early Chancery cases in this area).
156. STORY, supra note 155, § 1333; 3 POMEROY, supra note 155, § 1304;
ADAMS, supra note 155, at 599; Ram, supra note 155, at 184.
157. Ram, supra note 155, at 188-99. See also STORY, supra note 155, § 1334.
158. STORY, supra note 155, § 1341.
The exercise of equity jurisdiction over the persons of minors represents a
recognized exception to the sometimes-quoted rule that equity protects only property
rights and not personal rights. William Q. De Funiak, Equitable Protection of
Personal or Individual Rights, 36 KY. L.J. 7, 20 (1947); Joseph R. Long, Equitable
Jurisdiction to Protect Personal Rights, 33 YALE L.J. 115, 126-27 (1923); Roy
Moreland, Injunctive Control of Family Relations, 18 KY. L.J. 207, 220-23 (1930);
Thos. D. Theobald, Jr., Note, Does Equity Protect Property Rights in Domestic
1014 [Vol. 61
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The Missouri Supreme Court recognized the equitable nature of the
jurisdiction over parents and children in the leading case of Ex parte
Badger.'59 The court asserted that, regardless of the exact origins of this
jurisdiction,
This much is certain: [Jurisdiction as to the custody of minors] exists and
has been exercised by courts of equity for more than two centuries in
England and in the different states of this republic for shorter periods of
time, but for like purposes .... [T]he inherent power of a court of equity
over the persons and estates of infants is very wide.'
The court then set forth its reasons for the exercise of equity jurisdiction
in such cases:
The welfare of the child, its life, health, and moral and intellectual being,
are, in a proper exercise of the court's power, to be kept well in view in all
controversies concerning its custody, care, and control. In addition... the
welfare of the child should be looked to as a future member of society upon
whom in the fullness of time will fall its share of the burdens and
responsibilities of citizenship.'
The court then asserted that in proper cases, this equitable jurisdiction
extended to removing the child from the custody of its guardian, "although it
may result in taking the child from its own parents or in placing it in the
custody of one to the exclusion of the other."' 62 Subsequent Missouri cases
have followed the Badger principle.
63
The cases discussed above involved the power of the equity court to
remove a child from the custody of its parents. Adoption, however, was
Relations, 19 KY. L.J. 57, 65-67 (1930); Annotation, Jurisdiction of Equity to Protect
Personal Rights, 14 A.L.R. 295, 308-10 (1921). This "rule" itself has been sharply
criticized, and is of doubtful validity; see, e.g., Long, supra this note, at 132; J.Q.
Smith, Equity and Personal Rights, I BAYLOR L. REv. 184, 194 (1948); Ex parte
Badger, 226 S.W. 936, 938 (Mo. 1920) (en banc).
159. 226 S.W. 936 (Mo. 1920) (en banc).
160. Id. at 939.
161. Id,
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., State exrel. Warmuth v. Campbell, 431 S.W.2d 683, 686 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1968). The doctrine had in fact been expressed prior to the Badger decision.
See State ex rel. Cave v. Tincher, 166 S.W. 1028, 1030 (Mo. 1914).
The Badger decision is discussed approvingly in John M. Speca & Robert L.
Wehrman, Protecting the Rights of Children in Divorce Cases in Missouri, 38 UMKC
L. REV. 1, 16-18 (1969).
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unknown to the common law, and exists only by statute.1" Thus, although
it clearly relates to the "custody, care, and control" of children, some question
may be raised as to whether an adoption proceeding is equitable in nature.
Harold S. Cook argued that because the adoption statute has been held to be
"a code in itself," the Missouri Supreme Court erred in In re McDuffee, 65
where it asserted the equitable power to annul an adoption decree.
66
However, adoption proceedings are heard in the juvenile division of the circuit
court, which hears many actions clearly within the scope of Badger.67 Like
traditional courts of equity, the juvenile court sits without a jury; and it is
treated expressly as an equity court by Missouri statutory law. 6 Missouri
courts have held that for standard of review purposes, adoption cases are to
be treated as equitable actions. 69 It has been maintained that adoption is an
equitable power based on the "long-standing equitable power under which
children may be removed from the custody of their parents under the doctrine
of parens patriae."'7° Moreover, commentators have argued that, under
Badger, the power to terminate parental rights is part of the jurisdiction of
courts of equity.''
However, while the argument appears persuasive that adoption is
equitable in nature, there is no conclusive authority on point; therefore the
potential applicability of the maxim to adoption as a purely statutory cause of
action should also be considered. The modem tendency is to expand the
applicability of "unclean hands" to legal causes of action.' The merger of
law and equity courts in Missouri and the doctrine of equitable construction
of statutes present two other grounds suggesting that courts possess the power
to apply the maxim in these cases.
164. Hockaday v. Lynn, 98 S.W. 585, 586 (Mo. 1906); Limbaugh, supra note 52,
at 300-02.
165. 352 S.W.2d 23 (Mo. 1961) (en banc).
166. Cook, supra note 52, at 392, 404-05. The McDuffee court asserted the
power to annul the adoption based upon the equitable power to vacate all decrees when
circumstances warrant, and upon its duty to act in the best interests of the child.
McDuffee, 352 S.W.2d at 26-27.
167. See generally Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 211.011-211.490 (1994 & Supp. 1995)
(juvenile courts). See also Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 487.010-487.190 (1994 & Supp. 1995)
(family courts).
168. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.171.6 (Supp. 1995) ("The practice and procedure
customary in equity shall govern all proceedings in the juvenile court.").
169. In re E.C.N., 517 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
170. Simpson, supra note 58, at 353.
171. Speca & Wehrman, supra note 163, at 18.
172. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
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Law and equity were merged in Missouri in 1849 with the adoption of
the first code of civil procedure, a practice which continues to the present
day. 74 Different schools of thought exist as to the availability of equitable
defenses in legal actions under the merged system. Some writers have argued
that the merger was procedural in nature only; defenses equitable in nature
prior to the merger remain available only in equitable actions.
75
However, the argument has been powerfully advanced that the merger
was intended to bring about a complete fusion of law and equity, and that
equitable defenses should apply to legal actions under the civil procedure
codes (and presumably, under the rules). 76  Two scholarly articles
173. 1848-49 Mo. Laws 73 (cited in Earl T. Crawford, Equitable Defenses to
Actions at Law Under the Missouri Code, 25 WASH. U. L.Q. 60, 60 n.3 (1939)):
"There shall be in this state but one form of action for the enforcement or protection
of private rights, and redress or prevention of private wrongs, which shall be
denominated a civil action; ...."
174. Mo. Sup. Cr. R. 42.01, "One Form of Action": "There shall be one form
of action to be known as 'civil action'."
Mo. Sup. Or. R. 55.08 requires any "affirmative defense or avoidance" to be set
forth in any "pleading to a preceding pleading." Failure to plead an affirmative
defense results in waiver of the defense. Detling v. Edelbrock, 671 S.W.2d 265, 271
(Mo. 1984) (en banc). "Unclean hands," however, is not included in the long list of
defenses mentioned in the rule; under the principle that the court may raise it sua
sponte for the court's own protection (see supra note 145 and accompanying text), it
should remain available in theory to the court throughout the trial and appeal.
175. See Ralph A. Newman, What Light is Cast by History on the Nature of
Equity in Modern Law?, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 679-80 (1966) (merger of law and
equity "has failed to bring about a fusion of the substantive principles of equity with
the main body of the law. The principles of equity are still largely confined to cases
in which one of the litigants is entitled to specific or 'equitable' relief, and most of the
cases which come before our courts, those in which the plaintiff is entitled only to
damages, are decided without the benefit of elevated moral principles.. ."); WILLIAM
W. BARRON & ALEXANDER HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 141 (1950) (cited at
Newman, supra this note, at 679 n.14) ("Only procedural distinctions have been
abolished"); William F. Walsh, Is Equity Decadent?, 22 MINN. L. REV. 479, 489
(1938) (cited at Newman, supra, at 679 n.14) ("equitable defenses do not become legal
defenses under the Code merger"); Note, Equio-Clean Hands Doctrine-Application
of Maxim to Legal Defense, 23 MINN. L. REV. 382, 384 (1939) (application of
"unclean hands" maxim to legal action "not supportable").
Cf. Edward Yorio, A Defense of Equitable Defenses, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201
(1990) (on scholarly debate concerning survival of separate equitable defenses in the
merged system and related policy issues).
176. See generally Walter Wheeler Cook, Equitable Defenses, 32 YALE L.J. 645
(1923); William Haywood Moreland, Equitable Defenses, 1 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 153
(1940); 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
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addressing the subject in Missouri during the code years concluded that the
merger in this State was substantive as well as procedural.' Moreover,
"[n]ot long after the adoption of the code provisions, Missouri's appellate
courts made it clear that, as a general proposition, equitable defenses could be
pleaded in actions at law."'78 Another writer, commenting on the then-new
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (on which many of the current Missouri rules
are based), argued persuasively based on history that "[n]ow there is but one
form of action and in it the defendant may set up all defenses, legal or
equitable."
1 79
A more recent article by Professor Garvey observed that not all courts
have recognized the merger as being substantive in nature, and that to some
extent, the availability of equitable defenses still depends on the type of
remedy sought. 8 Garvey considered the reasons why equity jurisdiction
developed in the first place:
Because of its nature, law must be made for the general case. But human
conduct is so varied and its nuances so infinite that few general rules can
be formulated that can be applied fairly to all fact situations that might
come within their scope. Some allowance must be made for the unusual
combination of circumstances which individually are ignored in the
formulation of the rule but which in the aggregate demand modification of
it.181
Noting that law courts also traditionally exercised some equitable powers,
Garvey argues that equitable factors are relevant today in many "legal"
PROCEDURE § 1043 (2d ed. 1987).
Cf Sidney Post Simpson, Fifty Years ofAmerican Equity, 50 HARv. L. REV. 171,
179-81 (1939) (observing assimilation of many powers of equity courts into law
courts).
177. Crawford, supra note 173, at 60-66, 87; Ronald C. Spradley, Comment,
Defenses-Legaland Equitable: Merged in Missouri?, 32 Mo. L. REV. 109, 109-117
(1967) ("There are very few recent cases on the defenses which a defendant may or
may not assert in an action. This is probably the best evidence of the success of the
code in this area.")
But see Russell v. Casebolt, 384 S.W.2d 548, 553 (Mo. 1964) (in personal injury
action, stating broadly that "unclean hands" defense in unavailable in actions at law,
but refusing to "preclude the possibility of a dismissal upon the theory that the very
inherent nature of a case is illegal and against public policy"); In re Marriage of Smith,
721 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (following Russell).
178. Spradley, supra note 177, at 110.
179. Moreland, supra note 176, at 191.
180. John L. Garvey, Some Aspects of the Merger of Law and Equity, 10 CATH.
U. AM. L. REV. 59, 59-60 (1961) (citing Evans v. Mason, 308 P.2d 245 (1957)).
181. Id. at 61.
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actions: "If unconscionable behavior is determinative of the outcome of one
proceeding, it should also be at least material in the other." '82  While
observing that in some legal actions, such as torts, 183 equitable defenses are
inappropriate, their applicability should be decided by the nature of the
particular case and the effects of the remedies, rather than by historical
availability in separate procedural systems.'
Garvey's concern that rules cannot provide for every case has been dealt
with historically through the doctrine of equitable construction of statutes.
Blackstone explained the concept as follows:
It is said that a court of equity determines according to the spirit of the rule,
and not according to the strictness of the letter. But so also does a court of
law. Both, for instance, are equally bound, and equally profess, to interpret
statutes according to the true intent of the legislature. In general laws all
cases cannot be foreseen, or, if foreseen, cannot be expressed: some will
arise that will fall within the meaning, though not within the words of the
legislator; and others, which may fall within the letter, may be contrary to
his meaning, though not expressly excepted. These cases, thus out of the
letter, are often said to be within the equity of an act of parliament; and so
cases within the letter are frequently out of the equity. Here, by equity, we
mean nothing but the sound interpretation of the law; not that courts of
equity (so called) are more trusted or more obliged, than courts of law, to
give effect to such an interpretation." 5
The doctrine of equitable construction has been said to give equity "a
place in every rational system of jurisprudence,"'86 and appears to have
gained acceptance in England by the early seventeenth century.'87
The common law of England has been generally imported into the law
of Missouri,'88 and equitable construction appears in Missouri law from an
182. Id. at 66-68.
183. Russell v. Casebolt, 384 S.W.2d 548, 553 (Mo. 1964), supra note 177, in
which the court refused to apply "unclean hands" to actions at law, involved a tort
cause of action.
184. Garvey, supra note 180, at 70. Another argument for broader application
of equitable concepts in legal actions is found at Ralph A. Newman, The Place and
Function of Pure Equity in the Structure of Law, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 401 (1965).
185. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
*430-31 (quoted in On Construing Statutes by Equity, 6 AM. L. REG. 513, 514-15
(1858) [hereinafter Construing Statutes]).
186. Construing Statutes, supra note 185, at 515 (citing JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 7).
187. Id. at 516 (citing ASHE, EPEIKELA (1609)).
188. Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.010 (1994).
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early date. 8 9 The Missouri Supreme Court considered the doctrine's
application in Peny v. Strawbridge,'90 where it was held that a man who
murdered his wife could not inherit from her, despite the literal language of
the descent and distribution statutes.'9' The court noted that Missouri had
enacted the common law, including certain canons of statutory
construction."
Among these are: No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or
to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own
iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime. These maxims are
adopted by public policy, and have their foundation in the universal law
administered in all civilized countries. These maxims embodied in the
common law, and constituting an essential part of its warp and woof, are
found announced both in textbooks and reported cases.'"
The court found it unnecessary to give the statute at issue "a construction
abhorrent to reason."'194 The court stated that while the doctrine of equitable
construction was no longer itself recognized in Missouri, the "reasonable idea
at the base of the principle" had survived. 95 "This idea was that a given
case should not be taken to be within a statute, though apparently covered by
its comprehensive terms, unless it is within the spirit and reason of the
law." 196 The Perry court analogized its application of the doctrine in this
case to the judicial creation of exceptions to the Statute of Frauds, intended
to prevent the statute from being used to perpetrate fraud. 97
Some Missouri authority for equitable construction of adoption laws may
be found in Hockaday v. Lynn, 98 where the Supreme Court observed:
189. Riddick v. Walsh, 15 Mo. 519, 535 (1852) (cited in Construing Statutes,
supra note 185, at 518).
190. 108 S.W. 641 (Mo. 1908).
191. Id. at 642, 648.
192. Id. at 642-43.
193. Id. at 643-44 (quoting Box v. Lanier, 79 S.W. 1042, 1045 (Tenn. 1904)).
194. Id. at 645.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 645-46. See also Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143
U.S. 457, 459-61 (1892).
197. 108 S.W. at 647. Perry has never been overruled. While no modem
Missouri cases can be found following the precise argument of Perry, several cases
express the idea that the strict letter of a statute must at times yield to clear legislative
intent. See BCI Corp. v. Charlebois Constr. Co., 673 S.W.2d 774, 780 (Mo. 1984) (en
bane) (citing numerous cases).
198. 98 S.W. 585 (Mo. 1906).
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A statute is not to be construed as if it stood solitary and alone, complete
and perfect in itself, and isolated from all other laws. It is not to be
expected that a statute which takes its place in a general system of
jurisprudence shall be so perfect as to require no support from the rules and
statutes of the system of which it becomes a part, or so clear in all its terms
as to furnish in itself all the light needed for its construction. It is proper
to look to other statutes, to the rules of the common law, to the sources
from which the statute was derived, to the general principles of equity, to
the subject of the statute, and to the condition of affairs existing when the
statute was adopted.
199
A somewhat more recent writer has endorsed the equitable construction
doctrine as valuable,2"0 and more than one legal author has noted the need
for the availability of equitable principles to remedy omissions and to inject
a degree of morality into modem statutory law.20'
As noted earlier, very few courts appear to have considered the
applicability of the "unclean hands" maxim to the present context.20 2 In
1986, the Montana Supreme Court rejected an unclean hands defense on the
merits in an action for termination of parental rights.2 3  The California
Supreme Court in 1972,2" the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate
Division in 1978,205 and the Utah Supreme Court in 1991206 all rejected
"clean hands" approaches in adoption cases, in favor of consideration of the
199. Id. at 587 (quoting Humphries v. Davis, 100 Ind. 274, 284 (1884) (emphasis
added)).
200. Lattin, supra note 137, at 11-12.
201. Ralph A. Newman, THE HIDDEN EQUITY-An Analysis of the Moral
Content of the Principles of Equity, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 147, 149-53 (1967); Oleck,
supra note 137, at 548-49.
Cf Gary L. McDowell, Joseph Story's "Science" of Equity, 1979 Sup. CT. REv.
153, 157-66 (need for equity to complement and remedy the defects in the common
law and statutes).
202. Seelnre M.M.L., 469 So. 2d 1065, 1066-69 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (trial court
rested denial of stepparent adoption in part on unclean hands, where custodial parent
had interfered with visitation; appellate court affirming on "best interests of the child"
standard).
203. In re Male Child Born July 15, 1985 to L.C., 718 P.2d 660, 664 (Mont.
1986).
Cf Rich v. Rich, 364 S.E.2d 804, 805 (W. Va. 1987) ("unclean hands"-type
defense found unavailable on the merits in action to revoke an adoption).
204. San Diego County Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Superior Court, 496 P.2d 453,
458 (Cal. 1972) (en banc).
205. In re Adoption of a Child by I.T., 397 A.2d 341, 344-45 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1978).
206. In re Adoption of W.A.T., 808 P.2d 1083, 1085-86 (Utah 1991).
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"best interests of the child." None of these cases involved facts similar to
those of A.L.H..
Courts have considered "unclean hands" and other equitable defenses in
other kinds of domestic relations cases involving children. Courts have almost
uniformly refused to recognize the doctrine in custody cases,20 7 and have
likewise held it inapplicable to petitions for visitation;2 8 however, an
important exception is the statutory codification of a recognized common-law
"unclean hands" defense in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, where
the maxim may be used to prevent a parent who has wrongfully removed a
child to a different state from relitigating custody in the new location." 9
Equitable defenses seem to arise most often in actions to modify child support
obligations2 10 and to enforce child support arrearages, 21' and in these
207. See, e.g., Haynes v. Haynes, 904 S.W.2d 118, 120 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)
("unclean hands" does not bar petition, which is decided not "according to the strict
legal right of the petitioner, but upon the child's welfare"); Shelton v. Shelton, 653 So.
2d 283, 287 (Miss. 1995) (same); CSP v. DDC, 842 P.2d 528, 533 (Wyo. 1992)
(same); Weece v. Cottle, 352 S.E.2d 131, 134 (W. Va. 1986) (same); Taylor v. Taylor,
285 S.E.2d 150, 151-52 (W. Va. 1981) (same); Brown v. Kittle, 303 S.E.2d 864, 867-
68 (Va. 1983) (unclean hands defense available in other family law actions, but not
custody action where rights of child could be prejudiced).
But see the unusual case of Ruffalo v. Civiletti, 565 F. Supp. 34, 35-36 (W.D.
Mo. 1983) (mother's petition for change of custody denied on unclean hands grounds,
after the court determined she was pursuing the custody litigation solely in an attempt
to locate her husband, who was in the Witness Protection Program, so "criminal
elements" could kill him).
208. In re Brandie W., 203 Cal. Rptr. 537, 538-40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (denial
of visitation not in child's best interests).
209. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 8,9-I U.L.A. 252-66 (1988)
& 168-70 (Supp. 1995), codified at MO. REV. STAT. § 452.475 (1994). See, e.g.,
Gutzke v. Gutzke, 908 S.W.2d 198, 204 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995); Brown v. Brown, 847
S.W.2d 496, 508-09 (Tenn. 1993).
However, application of the defense by the court remains discretionary. "The
paramount issue is the welfare of the child rather than the tactics of the parent." In
re Adoption of Z.T.H., 910 S.W.2d 830, 836 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
For a pre-UCCJA application of this doctrine, see, e.g., Perrenoud v. Perrenoud,
480 P.2d 749, 763-64 (Kan. 1971) (collecting many cases on same subject).
210. Most courts appear to permit the unclean hands defense to be raised in
opposition to the non-custodial parent's motion to modify the child support obligation,
both prospectively and retrospectively. See, e.g., Robbins v. Robbins, 536 N.W.2d 77,
84 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995); Knaub v. Knaub, 512 N.W.2d 124, 128 (Neb. 1994);
Maddux v. Maddux, 475 N.W.2d 524, 530-31 (Neb. 1991); Grable v. Grable, 821
S.W.2d 16, 19-20 (Ark. 1991); Bumette v. Void, 509 A.2d 606, 607-08, 608 n.5 (D.C.
1986) (unclean hands may bar motion for reduction of child support, but not motion
for increase); In re Marriage of Phillips, 493 N.W.2d 872, 874-78 (Iowa Ct. App.
1022 [Vol. 61
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1992) (involving request for modification by incarcerated prisoner; citing many cases
involving same facts from other states); Noddin v. Noddin, 455 A.2d 1051, 1053-54
(N.H. 1983) (same); Thomasson v. Johnson, 903 P.2d 254, 257 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995)
(same) (collecting cases); Arizona ex rel. Dep't of Economic Sec. v. Ayala, 916 P.2d
504, 507 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (same) (collecting cases).
Some courts, however, have refused to recognize the defense on policy grounds.
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Carlson, 693 P.2d 496, 499 (Mont. 1984).
See also Crowley v. Crowley, 878 S.W.2d 70, 73-74 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)
(rejecting an "unclean hands" defense on the merits); Parker v. Parker, 645 So. 2d
1327, 1329-31 (Miss. 1994) (same).
Marital misconduct as an "unclean hands" defense has been made irrelevant to
the initial child support determination in Missouri by statute. Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 452.340.1 (1994).
211. Some courts will not permit the unclean hands defense to be raised in child
support arrearage actions as a matter of law, on the grounds that the child, not the
parent, is the beneficiary of the support. The child is thus an "innocent actor." In re
R.A.S., 826 S.W.2d 397, 401 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Westgate v. Westgate, 887 P.2d
737, 739 (Nev. 1994); Appert v. Appert, 341 S.E.2d 342, 348-50 (N.C. Ct. App.
1986); Bland v. Larsen, 627 A.2d 79, 84-85 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993); McReynolds
v. McReynolds, 787 P.2d 530, 532-33 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing Race v. Race, 740
P.2d 253, 256 (Utah 1987), and Reick v. Reick, 652 P.2d 916, 917 (Utah 1982));
Cuccia v. Cuccia, 773 S.W.2d 928, 930-31 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); Muller v. Muller,
515 A.2d 1291, 1295-96 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986); Kansas State Dept. of Social
& Rehabilitation Serv. v. Henderson, 620 P.2d 60, 61-62 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980); Todd
v. Pochop, 365 N.W.2d 559, 559-60 (S.D. 1985).
Other courts have allowed application of the "unclean hands" maxim and other
equitable defenses in child support arrearage actions to remain in the discretion of the
trial court. See, e.g., LaRoe v. LaRoe, 893 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Ark. Ct. App. 1995);
see also Alley v. Bennett, 379 S.E.2d 294, 295 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989) (case decided on
unclean hands grounds, but issue not properly preserved for appeal).
The California Supreme Court has drawn a fine distinction, making the unclean
hands defense unavailable in an action where the custodial parent has merely
"interfered" with visitation, but available where the custodial parent "actively conceals"
the child and the noncustodial parent is unable to locate the child despite "reasonably
diligent efforts." In re Marriage of Damico, 872 P.2d 126, 128-33 (Cal. 1994)
(reviewing numerous earlier California appellate cases).
The objections to "unclean hands" appear much weaker when the doctrine works
to the child's benefit. See, e.g., Jackman v. Pelusi, 550 A.2d 199, 204-05 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1988) (non-custodial parent barred by unclean hands from asserting laches defense
to child support arrearage action; court raising doctrine sua sponte); Froats v. Froats,
415 N.W.2d 445, 447 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (non-custodial parent barred by unclean
hands from asserting laches defense); Newman v. Newman, 459 So. 2d 1129, 1131
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (same).
Equitable estoppel and waiver by acquiescence have been permitted as a defense
to child support in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Boland v. State, Dept. of Social
1023
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contexts, courts have split on the applicability of the defenses. To the extent
that any trend is visible in the cases, it appears to be that the unclean hands
defense is freely applied only when it works to the benefit of the child.
The few commentators who have written on the subject have been
generally critical of the application of the "unclean hands" maxim to domestic
relations actions. Professor Dobbs argues that the maxim's application in
divorce,"' custody, and adoption disputes is often "spurious," and "may only
Serv., Div. of Child Support Enforcement, 910 S.W.2d 754, 757-59 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995) (waiver) (collecting Missouri cases); Morrison v. Meadors, 892 S.W.2d 786, 790
(Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (waiver); Hale v. Hale, 781 S.W.2d 815, 819-20 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989); Rodgers v. Rodgers, 505 S.W.2d 138, 145-46 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) (estoppel);
LaRue v. LaRue, 832 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (estoppel); Larsen v.
Larsen, 340 P.2d 421,421-22 (Utah 1959) (laches, waiver, and estoppel); McCurry v.
McCurry, 874 P.2d 25, 28 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (waiver) (citing Williams v.
Williams, 781 P.2d 1170, 1177 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 781 P.2d 782
(N.M. 1989)); McKellar v. McKellar, 871 P.2d 296, 297 (Nev. 1994) (estoppel and
waiver) (citing Parkinson v. Parkinson, 796 P.2d 229, 231 (Nev. 1990)); Ramsey v.
Ramsey, 861 S.W.2d 313, 316-17 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993); Thrash v. Thrash, 809 P.2d
665, 667-68 (Okla. 1991); McNattin v. McNattin, 450 N.W.2d 169, 172 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990); State ex rel. Pittman v. Stanjeski, 562 So. 2d 673, 678 (Fla. 1990);
Williams v. Williams, 294 N.W.2d 357, 362-63 (Neb. 1980). See also In re Marriage
of Shoemaker, 904 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (equitable doctrines may
be used to make retrospective reductions in child support obligations in appropriate
circumstances) (citing additional Washington cases).
But see Hershey v. Hershey, 467 N.W.2d 484 486-87 (S.D. 1991) (estoppel not
available) (but see id. at 490 (dissenting opinions of Henderson, J., and Morgan,
Retired Judge) (arguing for applicability of unclean hands defense)); Stich v. Stich,
435 N.W.2d 848, 852-53 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (estoppel not available).
Other courts have made all equitable defenses unavailable in child support
actions. See, e.g., Rutledge v. Barrett, 802 S.W.2d 604, 605-07 (Tenn. 1991); Schrock
v. Gonser, 658 N.E.2d 615, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (but see id. at 616-18 (Baker,
J., dissenting) (noting historical and present equitable nature of divorce and child
support actions, and arguing for the applicability of equitable principles in applying the
statutory provisions)).
Equitable defenses have been held available in an action for contempt for
nonpayment of child support. Morin v. Morin, 466 So. 2d 1255, 1257 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); Mask v. Mask, 620 P.2d 883, 885 (N.M. 1980).
212. A thorough discussion of the application of the "unclean hands" maxim in
the field of divorce and annulment is beyond the scope of this Note. See generally
W.A. Purrington, Of Matrimonial Suits as Equity Suits and of the Pleadings Therein,
9 COLum. L. REV. 321 (1909); Chafee, supra note 137, at 1083-90; Poll, supra note
137, at 76-77; Fadeley, supra note 137, at 160-61; Note, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1079
(1954); Note, Domestic Relations-Doctrine of Unclean Hands, 19 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
153 (1945); Matthew J. Doyle, Note, The "Clean Hands" Doctrine as Applied to
Marriage Annulment Proceedings, 24 MARQ. L. REV. 212 (1940); Note, Application
[Vol. 611024
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be a fuzzy version of some other standard, such as the 'best interests of the
child' standard."2 3 Taylor has noted a few decisions in which courts have
used the "unclean hands" doctrine to deny motions for visitation, where the
petitioner is delinquent in support payments;214 or to deny motions to
enforce child support, when the petitioner has interfered with visitation
rights."5 She sharply criticizes this practice:
The practical effect of denying parents a remedy is to prevent the child
from obtaining the rights to which he is entitled even though his hands are
clean. By automatically refusing to grant a remedy in this situation the
court punished the child without considering the child's interest. Because
of this, the equitable doctrine of clean hands cannot be legitimately relied
upon as a basis for conditioning obligations.216
of the "Clean Hands" Doctrine, 9 TEMP. L.Q. 220, 223 (1935); Leonard J.
Emmerglick, "Clean Hands" v. Public Policy in the Nullity of Bigamous Marriages,
4 DAKOTA L. REv. 3 (1932); Note, Application of Clean Hands Doctrine to Annulment
of Void Marriages, 16 MINN. L. REv. 215 (1932); Gordon Sinykin, Note,
Marriage-Annulment for Bigamy-Plaintiffs Misconduct or Unclean Hands-
Property Incidents, 7 WIS. L. REV. 108 (1932); Note, Marriage-Annulment-
Equitable Disabilities-Requisite of "Clean Hands", 80 U. PA. L. REv. 309 (1931).
It has been observed that historically, a variety of affirmative defenses to divorce
in the nature of unclean hands were available in Missouri. 3 HALE HouTs, MIssouRI
PLEADING AND PRACTICE ANNOTATED §§ 846-47, 849 (1936). See, e.g., Hugeback
v. Hugeback, 444 S.W.2d 23, 27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (application of "clean hands"
defense in divorce action); Taylor v. Taylor, 355 S.W.2d 383 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962)
("clean hands" applicable to annulment action); Cody v. Cody, 233 S.W.2d 777, 782
(Mo. Ct. App. 1950) ("clean hands" defense applicable to divorce action, which is
"analogous to a proceeding in equity"). These defenses were abolished in Missouri
divorce actions by statute in 1973. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.310.5 (1994).
A few recent examples of the modem application of the unclean hands defense
in the divorce setting are found at Sanbom v. Sanbom, 503 N.W.2d 499, 504 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1993) (laches defense to petition to reopen divorce decree barred by unclean
hands); Sheridan v. Sheridan, 589 A.2d 1067, 1068 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1990)
(unclean hands will bar request for equitable division of property illegally obtained,
but not request for alimony, child support, or counsel fees); Peterson v. Peterson, 449
N.W.2d 835, 842-43 (S.D. 1989) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (arguing for applicability
of unclean hands to bar request for counsel fees).
213. DOBBS, supra note 137, § 2.4(1).
214. Taylor, supra note 131, at 1070, 1070 n.77.
215. Id. at 1070, 1070 n.76.
216. Id. at 1071.
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Taylor thus recommends that the child support/visitation cases should be
excluded from the equitable doctrine on the grounds of public policy.
217
None of the reported decisions, however, contain an extended discussion
of the applicability and appropriateness of the "unclean hands" maxim in the
stepparent adoption context. Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinion
in A.L.H., summarized in the next section, expressly considered the issue.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Majority Opinion
The A.L.H. majority opened its discussion by setting forth the applicable
law governing stepparent adoption and involuntary termination of parental
rights. The court noted that adoption statutes are strictly construed in favor




Before adoption can take place, there must be either consent or involuntary
termination of parental rights.2 9
A finding of either willful abandonment or willful neglect supports
termination." The court stated that these are "different, but not mutually
exclusive concepts."' Abandonment involves the relinquishment of
custody with no further intent to claim parental rights and duties, or
intentional withholding from the child of the parent's "love, care, protection,
and presence, without just cause or excuse."2 "2 Neglect focuses on physical
deprivation or harm, and can often be shown "by a failure to provide support,
without just cause or excuse."'
The majority observed that the standard of proof is clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence: "that which instantly tilts the scales in the affirmative
when weighed against the opposing evidence.2 24 On appellate review, the
court reviews the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable
to the judgment.2 5 Though reference to similar cases may be "helpful,"
217. Id. at 1070-71.
218. In re A.L.H., 906 S.W.2d 373, 375 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (citing H.W.S. v.
C.T., 827 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)).
219. Id (citing Matter of J.F.K., 853 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Mo. 1993) (en banc)).
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each cases is decided on its facts.2 6  The majority deferred to the trial
court's determination that Father's evidence was not credible.227
Though adoption statutes are construed strictly in favor of the natural
parent, the "paramount concern" is the best interests of the child."8
However, the court does not reach the best interests issue if willful
abandonment or neglect for the statutory period is not proven. 9 The court
stressed that the statutory period of abandonment for a child over one year of
age has been reduced twice, from two years to one in 1947, and from one year
to six months in 1982 ."° The court stated, "We believe these reductions
evidence a legislative intent to place a greater emphasis on the enhancement
for opportunities for the establishment of permanent parental relationships for
the child and a lesser emphasis on the parental interests.""nl
The court noted that here, the relevant statutory period ran from
September 3, 1992, to March 3, 1993.2 Though conduct relevant to intent
may occur before, during, or after the statutory period, the greatest weight is
given to conduct during the period, and "logically, the least to conduct after
the petition was filed.""n3 Stating that failure to contribute financial support
coupled with a lack of contact can constitute willful neglect, the court turned
to examination of the trial court's findings as to support and contact.3
After reviewing the facts related to Father's past nonsupport, the court
relied on G.S.M. v. T.H.B.Y and allocated the "clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence" standard of proof among the parties.ns The court
stated that "[a] sensible allocation, we believe, permits the petitioners to
establish a prima facie case of willful neglect by showing, with clear and
convincing evidence, that the natural father had a duty to pay child support
and failed to do so. '"" The burden on that issue then shifts to the
respondent to show that the failure to pay was not willful; if he does,
226. Id. (citing S.C.H. v. C.W.H., 587 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979)).
227. Id. (citing H.W.S. v. C.T., 827 S.W.2d 237, 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)).
228. Id. (citing In re Adoption of R.A.B., 562 S.W.2d 356, 357 (Mo. 1978) (en
banc)).
229. Id.




234. Id. (citing S.C.H. v. C.W.H., 587 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979)).
235. G.S.M. v. T.H.B., 786 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
236. A.L.H., 906 S.W.2d at 377.
237. Id. (quoting G.S.M. v. T.H.B., 786 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)).
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petitioners must prove his explanation pretextual or unreasonable by clear and
convincing evidence. 8
Here, the court held the requisite showing of duty to pay and failure to
pay had been made." After reviewing the facts concerning Father's work
history, the majority found that Father was unable to make the needed
showing that his failure to pay was not willful, since his testimony showed "a
total lack of specific evidence as to his work history within the statutory
period, i.e., whether he was unemployed, seeking work, or unable to
work.""24  The court found Father had "at least" the ability to make the
$25.00 per week payments promised in September 1992.241 The court noted
that Father "knew the conduits for payment of child support and continued to
neglect such obligation," and disregarded the Christmas and birthday gifts sent
by Father as "token efforts" which failed to make up for the general lack of
visitation and support during the statutory period.242
The court firmly rejected Father's argument concerning Mother's
interference with his visitation: "[W]e note that his child support obligation
'is not interchangeable with his right to visit her, and it does not necessarily
depend upon the natural mother's noninterference with his right of
visitation."'243 Nonetheless, the majority indicated that it accepted the trial
court's conclusion that, although Father was not aware of the child's
whereabouts, "[he] made no efforts to locate the child during the period of
January 1992 to March 3, 1993. '244
The court reviewed the facts concerning visitation, and stated that "[a]fter
Christmas 1991, some of Mother's testimony would support a conclusion that
she would not have been enthusiastic about allowing Father visitation and
Father's testimony, if believed, would support a conclusion he requested
visitation and those requests were denied. " 245 Although acknowledging the
principle that interference with visitation and communication "must be taken
into account" in stepparent adoption cases, 2 46 the majority stated that it was
bound by the trial court's resolution of the issue of contact.247 Having
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id at 377-78.
241. Id. at 378.
242. Id. at 378, 378 n.2.
243. Id. at 378 (citing G.S.M. v. T.H.B., 786 S.W.2d 898, 903 (Mo. Ct. App.
1990)).
244. Id. at 378, 378 n.3.
245. Id at 378-79.
246. Id. at 379 n.7 (citing In re Adoption of S.E.F., 634 S.W.2d 265, 267 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1982)).
247. Id. at 379.
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reached these conclusions on the issues of unjustified nonpayment of support
and lack of contact, the majority affirmed the trial court on the ground of
willful neglect, deeming it unnecessary to reach the willful abandonment
issue.248
B. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Crahan, writing in dissent, agreed with the guardian ad litem that
Mother had failed to prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that
Father had "either willfully neglected or willfully abandoned the child so as
to justify termination of his parental rights." '249 He noted that this would be
an easy custody case, but custody was not at issue."' The dissent framed
the issue as "whether Father's parental rights to the child should be
terminated, and in essence, transferred to Stepfather, thereby severing all links
between Father and his child.
20'
The dissent stressed the importance of parental rights, and stated that the
court's jurisdiction to terminate was an "awesome power," purely statutory in
origin, not to be exercised without "strict and literal compliance with the
statutory scheme." 2 Arguing that these rights should not be "lightly cast
aside for some paternalistic social theory," he emphasized the "clear, cogent
and convincing evidence" burden as proof that "instantly tilts the scales" and
leaves in the factfinder's mind "an abiding conviction that the evidence is
true.1
25 3
Tuming to the issue of willful neglect, the dissent wrote:
Willful neglect has been defined by this court as the failure to perform the
duty with which the parent is charged by law according to acceptable
community standards ... In order to be willful, the neglect must be
intentional, deliberate, and without just cause or excuse, thus excluding acts
which occur because of events which are beyond the control of the parent
and which are not his fault.25
4
248. Id. at 378-79.
249. Id. at 379 (Crahan, J., dissenting).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. (citing S.K.L. v. Smith, 480 S.W.2d 119, 123 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972); In
re Taylor, 419 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967); In re C., 468 S.W.2d 689, 691
(Mo. Ct. App. 1971)).
253. Id. (citing State v. Taylor, 323 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959));
S.K.L. v. Smith, 480 S.W.2d 119, 123 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972); In re T.M.E., 874 S.W.2d
552, 559 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)).
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He found the majority's allocation of the burden of proof under G.S.M2 1
to be inconsistent with this definition, with the "clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence" standard, and with "solemn presumptions in favor of the natural
parent.2 5
6
The dissent proceeded to distinguish on its facts the G.S.M decision
relied on by the majority. G.S.M was based on the trial court's express
finding that the father had the ability to pay the amount of support due. In
A.L.H., Mother had conceded at trial that the amount of support ordered was
above the child support guidelines, and had been based on Mother's expenses
rather than Father's ability to pay; the decree had simply been a consent
decree, based solely on a finding that the support provisions were "not
unconscionable."257 Moreover, in G.S.M, the father had never made any
support payments; here, the evidence showed that Father had made payments,
"and discontinued regular payments only after he was refused further visitation
and had undertaken to procure legal assistance to restore his visitation
rights.""us The gifts Father attempted to send the Daughter during this time
were donated to others. While acknowledging that interference with visitation
does not justify nonpayment of child support, the dissent concluded that there
was no evidence that Father had the means to both pay his support obligation
and to retain legal counsel to enforce his visitation rights, and no evidence that
any deprivation to the child resulted from the nonpayment.21 9 "In sum, there
was no clear, cogent and convincing evidence of willful neglect.2 60
Judge Crahan found the willful abandonment ground even more easily
disposed of, since Mother had moved to a new location not revealed to Father
until after the petition was filed:26
Indeed, if anything in this record can be said to be supported by clear,
cogent and convincing evidence, it is that since the time Mother and
Stepfather became engaged in late spring or early summer of 1991, Mother
engaged in a persistent pattern of conduct designed to remove Father from
the child's life and to substitute Stepfather as "dad" in the child's eyes.262
255. G.S.M. v. T.H.B., 786 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).





261. Id at 380-81.
262. Id. at 381 (emphasis added).
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He cited in this regard the facts of the undisclosed change of address; the
refusal of visitation; Mother's encouraging the child to call Stepfather "dad;"
and allowing the child to begin using Stepfather's surname. 63
The dissent concluded that willful abandonment, defined as a willful
desertion, willful relinquishment of parental rights and duties, or withholding
of "care, protection, love and presence" without just cause, had not been
shown by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence on these facts.26" He
argued that the evidence did not show how Father could have found out the
child's whereabouts; that the phone number at Mother's work was not for
personal calls; and that any "suggestion that Father should have tailed or
stalked Mother to her new address" is "irresponsible.""26 He further asserted
that Father should not be "faulted" for his attempts to enforce his visitation
rights through proper legal channels.2" Moreover, the dissent observed that
Mother's relatives were an unreliable source of contact with the child, and
would not disclose to Father the child's whereabouts.267
Judge Crahan concluded that Father's lack of contact with Daughter was
solely the result of Mother's actions in refusing visitation and concealing the
child's whereabouts.268 "Such actions have been held to preclude a finding
of abandonment." '269 He stated that since neither willful neglect nor willful
abandonment was shown, he concluded the judgment should have been
reversed.
V. COMMENT
As Judge Crahan recognized in his A.L.H dissent, the power to terminate
parental rights is an "awesome power,"27' involving serious and irrevocable
consequences for both parent and child. An English barrister wrote in 1829
that the equitable jurisdiction to remove children from the custody of their
parents was intended only for "extreme cases;" '272 Pomeroy referred to the







269. Id. (citing Deardorff v. Bohannon, 761 S.W.2d 651, 654-55 (Mo. Ct. App.
1988)).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 379.
272. Ram, supra note 155, at 211.
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enlightened discretion of the court."273  The legislature has correctly
perceived that situations often arise in which it will be most beneficial to the
child to terminate the rights of unfit natural parents and to provide the child
with a permanent and loving home, and has thus provided a means by which
this can be accomplished.274 Nonetheless, discussion of these matters should
only proceed with full awareness of the gravity of the rights and interests at
issue.275
Judge Crahan set forth numerous and valid reasons why the termination
of parental rights and stepparent adoption should have been refused in the
principal case.276 This Note's purpose, however, is not to focus on the
arguments discussed by the A.L.H. majority and dissent, but rather to suggest
an alternative disposition of the case which may provide a rule of decision for
this narrow, but recurring,277 fact pattern in future cases.27
Because the exercise of this power carries with it such severe
consequences, courts must be vigilant in preventing its abuse for selfish and
wrongful ends. This Note contends that where the custodial parent and his/her
new spouse have significantly interfered with the non-custodial parent's
relationship with the child, the equitable doctrine of "unclean hands" should
be invoked and the doors of the juvenile court closed to the petitioners seeking
a termination of parental rights and stepparent adoption.279 The materials
presented above suggest strongly that courts have the power to apply the
maxim in these cases, and that as a matter of public policy it is manifestly
appropriate that they should do so.
Although adoption is purely a statutory action, the conclusion seems
compelled that it is an equitable action in nature-a proceeding concerning the
"custody, care, and control" of the child in the sense contemplated by the
Missouri Supreme Court in Ex Parte Badger280 and by the nineteenth
century treatise writers cited above. 28' The principal distinction is that an
273. 3 POMEROY, supra note 155, § 1307.
274. See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 107-22 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 248-69 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 63-96 and accompanying text.
278. There is no indication that "unclean hands" was argued by counsel for Father
in A.L.H. However, under the court's power to raise the doctrine sua sponte, the case
could, at least in theory, have been decided on this ground. See supra note 145 and
accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
280. 226 S.W. 936, 939 (Mo. 1920) (en banc); see supra notes 159-63 and
accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text. Courts are often faced with
the question of whether modem statutory causes of action are legal or equitable in
[Vol. 611032
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adoption decree adjudicates the issues of "custody, care, and control"
permanently, whereas ordinary custody decrees are modifiable. The
fundamental, underlying nature of the action remains an exercise of
jurisdiction by the court over the person of the child, historically an equitable
function.
Even if adoption were not to be considered a purely equitable action, the
availability of "unclean hands" is reinforced by the doctrine of equitable
interpretation of statutes to reach just results in cases not within the
contemplation of the legislature,282 approved in principle in Perry v.
Strawbridge.283 The authorities suggesting that equitable defenses are
intended to be available in legal and equitable actions alike under Missouri's
merged judicial system284 provide additional support for the court's power
to apply equitable principles in proper circumstances. Thus the juvenile court,
presented with appropriate facts, might fairly cite any or all three of these
grounds in asserting the power to decline jurisdiction based on the equitable
doctrine of "unclean hands."
Application of the maxim rests within the discretion of the trial judge,
and is strongly influenced by public policy considerations.285 Commentators
have persuasively attacked application of the doctrine to bar actions to enforce
child support or visitation,286 and most courts have rejected the maxim
where its application would deny child support, proper custody, or visitation
rights to the child(ren) of the parties. 87 These conclusions appear correct,
since it is not the child's hands which are "unclean," and application of the
doctrine based on the conduct of one of the parents would usually serve to
defeat a vital interest of the child.
nature, for purposes of determining the right to jury trial. See, e.g., JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE, & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 11.3-
11.5 (2d ed. 1993). As noted above, there is no jury trial right in the
termination/adoption proceeding, see supra note 168 and accompanying text, which
may evidence legislative contemplation of the action as equitable in nature.
282. See supra notes 185-201 and accompanying text.
283. 108 S.W. 641, 645-46 (Mo. 1908); see supra notes 190-97 and
accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 173-84 and accompanying text. This argument is the most
doubtful, given the language in Russell v. Casebolt, 384 S.W.2d 548, 553 (Mo. 1964),
supra note 177. Russell may be fairly distinguished, however, in that it involved a
personal injury action in which the "unclean hands" defense would have been
inappropriate on policy grounds in any event. See supra notes 182-84 and
accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
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Termination of parental rights/stepparent adoption cases, however, are
distinguishable from the class of cases discussed above. Though all these
proceedings are typically contested by the parents, the child's interests are
substantially different in the adoption context. As noted above, a stepparent
adoption does not ordinarily serve to protect the child from harm or to secure
financial benefits to the child.28 The child typically resides in the home of
petitioners prior to the adoption, already receiving their care, nurture, and
support. Moreover, the adoption is likely to involve substantial costs to the
child: loss of visitation with the other natural parent, loss of entitlement to
child support from that parent, loss of inheritance from and through the
natural parent, loss of contacts with other relatives of that parent, and,
particularly in the case of an older child, lasting psychological harm and sense
of loss from the permanent severing of the relationship with the natural
parent.289 What "the best interests of the child" means is often less clear in
the stepparent adoption context than in custody, visitation, or support
proceedings.290
The interests of the parents, however, are prominent and substantial in the
stepparent adoption proceeding. The non-custodial parent stands to
permanently lose all connection and relationship with his/her child-for a
devoted parent, one of the most devastating losses known to human
experience. The remarried custodial parent also has important interests that
will be served by obtaining the stepparent adoption decree. These may
include very legitimate goals, such as strengthening the bonds between the
stepparent and the child, giving the child a sense of permanence and belonging
in the "new" family,29' and preventing a truly uninterested non-custodial
parent from creating unnecessary occasional turbulence in the child's life.
However, as Professor Blair forcefully points out, the custodial parent
may also have improper motives which run counter to the settled principles
of domestic relations law-feelings of anger and bitterness toward the other
parent which create a desire to remove that person permanently from his/her
own life and that of the child; a desire to prevent the child from having
visitation and communication with the other parent; or a desire to make it
288. See supra notes 107-08, 112 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 126-34. It is noteworthy that the A.L.H. court terminated
Father's parental rights upon making the finding of willful neglect, without requiring
specific findings as to how termination of his rights would actually serve Daughter's
best interests. This seems at least arguably inconsistent with the directive that the
adoption laws be construed "so as to promote the best interests and welfare of the
child." Mo. REV. STAT. § 453.005 (1994).
291. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.005 (1994).
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impossible for the other parent to relitigate issues of custody. 2 As a
practical matter, many custodial parents seeking termination of parental
rights/stepparent adoption probably experience a mixture of "proper" and
"improper" motives.
Thus, while custody, visitation, and support proceedings may be properly
understood as being in the interest of the child, the contested
termination/adoption proceeding is likely to be more in the nature of an action
between the parents. The distinction is not absolute, but one of degree;
however, it is critical to an assessment of the applicability of the "unclean
hands" doctrine. To the extent the action may be understood as one between
the parents, then the equity court may properly consider the petitioner's
conduct in determining whether to exercise its jurisdiction.
The dangerousness of the precedent set in the A.R.M-G.S.M-A.L.H. line
of cases in the Eastern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals293 is found
in their lesson for the sharp practitioner. Under these cases, a remarried
custodial parent may virtually pre-ordain a finding of unjustified lack of
contact, and perhaps willful abandonment, by concealing the location of the
child or otherwise frustrating the non-custodial parent's communication
attempts for the statutory period. As Judge Karohl predicted in his A.R.M
dissent, this creates a virtual "license to steal." '294 Unscrupulous lawyers may
now counsel custodial parents to withhold court-ordered visitation rights, with
the reasonable hope of establishing grounds for an involuntary termination
proceeding. Lower-income non-custodial parents are placed at even greater
risk, under the G.S.M-A.L.H. rule that nonpayment of child support, without
more, establishes a prima facie case of willful neglect. 95
Strong policy reasons thus counsel in favor of the applicability of the
"unclean hands" doctrine in termination/adoption cases where the petitioners
have actively interfered with the relationship between the non-custodial parent
and child. Applying the maxim to bar petitioners in such cases from relief
serves the important public policies of encouraging implementation of divorce
decrees and providing children with the opportunity for a continued
relationship with the non-custodial parent through visitation.296 Courts may
not have the power to prevent custodial parents from attempting to obtain an
improper "super-custody" decree through an adoption proceeding; but there is
no reason to encourage such behavior.297
292. See supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 106, 109-11 and accompanying text.
294. In re A.R.M., 750 S.W.2d 86, 93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (Karohl, J.,
dissenting).
295. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
296. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.400 (1994).
297. See In re A.R.M., 750 S.W.2d 86, 94 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (Karohl, J.,
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Moreover, application of "unclean hands" in these cases is entirely
consistent with the stated underlying purpose of the maxim-protection of the
integrity of the courts.29 This need, no less urgent today than a century
ago, is just as critical in statutory actions as in traditional claims for equitable
relief. The Perry court refused to permit itself to be used as a vehicle by
which a murderer could inherit from the wife he killed, despite the literal
language of the statutes of descent and distribution; the court approvingly
observed judicially created exceptions to the Statute of Frauds designed to
prevent its abuse to commit fraud.299 Missouri's juvenile courts should
similarly refuse to permit themselves to be used to deprive a child
permanently of a relationship with a natural parent, where the petitioners have
deliberately prevented the non-custodial parent from maintaining contact with
the child.
The frequency with which these cases recur suggests the need for
enunciation of a clear policy that Missouri courts will not permit the adoption
statute to be abused in this fashion.3" These fact patterns present a classic
"unclean hands" situation-unconscionable conduct of petitioners, which leads
the court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction to hear their cause.0 1
Because the recent cases from the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District,
are inconsistent with decisions on similar facts in the Southern and Western
Districts, as well as with earlier Eastern District decisions, the issue appears
ripe for resolution by the Missouri Supreme Court.02 Even without
definitive guidance from the Supreme Court, the juvenile courts and the courts
of appeals have the power to apply the "unclean hands" maxim to these types
of cases on their own initiative, based on the existing authorities discussed in
this Note.
Moreover, making the "unclean hands" defense available in cases similar
to A.L.H. will not frustrate the underlying policies of the adoption statute.
Involuntary termination of parental rights/stepparent adoption proceedings
could still be brought; the petitioners would simply have to "play fair."
Excluding custodial parents such as those in A.L.H. from relief would actually
serve the policies of the statute and the "clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence" standard: where the custodial parents had done nothing to obstruct
the non-custodian's contact with the child, a court could have much stronger
confidence in its findings of "willful neglect" and "willful abandonment." A
judicial construction of the adoption statute requiring stepparent adoption
dissenting).
298. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
299. Perry v. Strawbridge, 108 S.W. 641, 646-48 (Mo. 1908).
300. See supra notes 63-96 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 63-96 and accompanying text.
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petitioners to cooperate with the visitation rights of the non-custodial parent
would enhance the internal consistency of Missouri domestic relations
law,303 and would serve the child's best interests by contributing to
preservation of the parent-child relationship in those cases where there is a
valuable relationship to preserve. Moreover, the child's right to terminate the
relationship with the natural parent by consenting to a stepparent adoption
upon reaching the age of majority would remain unaffected.3°
Equity has long served to complement and remedy the defects of the
common law and statutes. 5 Over forty years ago, Professor Oleck aptly
observed that
[s]ince the maxims of equity represent the very essence of the principles of
equity, it seems the merest common sense that these maxims should not be
allowed to fall into neglect. If equity is important to modem jurisprudence,
even as mere background, its principles should be studied and developed
continually .... The correlation of the highly moral principles of equity
and other principles of like origin, and the extraction from them of ever-
more-clearly-enunciated principles, is a task which has been sorely
neglected in this century." 6
The use of the "unclean hands" doctrine to prevent the abuse of
involuntary termination of parental rights/stepparent adoption proceedings
would represent movement in the direction urged by Oleck. The interests of
children, parents, and the courts would all be better served.
KARL A.W. DEMARCE
303. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
304. Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.030.5 (1994).
305. See McDowell, supra note 201, at 157-66.
306. Oleck, supra note 137, at 548-49.
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